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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE SANDOVAL, individually 
and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
his minor children, LAVATO 
SANDOVAL, SHAWNIELLE SANDOVAL, 
and DANIELLE SANDOVAL, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
IDA TSOSIE SMITH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20648 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the trial judge ruled correctly in 
determining that as a matter of law the defendant was not 
negligent, that reasonable minds could not differ on the 
issue, and in directing a verdict for the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by the plaintiff/appellant, 
Wayne Sandoval, of behalf of himself personally and in 
his capacity as Guardian Ad Litem on behalf of his three 
minor children. Appellants are seeking damages from the 
defendant/respondent, Ida Tsosie Smith, for the wrongful 
death of their wife and mother, Virginia Sandoval. 
When plaintiffs rested their case, the defendant 
moved for a directed verdict in compliance with Rule 50 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the 
defendant based his motion upon the grounds that plaintiffs 
had not proven a prima facie case and specifically had 
failed to prove negligence as against the defendant. 
The Court held that based upon the evidence 
presented by the plaintiffs, "as a matter of law the 
defendant was not negligent and reasonable minds cannot 
differ on the issue. Accordingly the defendant's Motion 
for a Directed Verdict is granted." (R. 151). Plaintiffs 
have now appealed from the granting of that motion. 
The plaintiffs1 decedent was killed in a 
pedestrian/auto accident which occurred at approximately 
11:00 p.m. on the 29th day of May, 1982f on U.S. Highway 
89, south and east of Kanab, Utah. (R. 5, 9). 
The Sandovals originated their journey that day 
from their home in Castle Dale, Utah. (R. 201) . During 
the hours prior to the collision, Mrs. Sandoval had been 
behaving in such a manner that her husband considered her 
confused and irrational. (R. 241, 242). At one point, 
Mrs. Sandoval indicated "she was about ready to leave 
Mr. Sandoval for good". (R. 241)* During the trip, 
Mrs. Sandoval stated repeatedly that she was going to 
die. The Sandovals argued concerning her continual 
comments about dying. (R. 202, 203). Eventually, 
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Mr, Sandoval decided to let his wife drive, hoping that 
that would occupy her so she would stop talking about her 
death. (R. 203) . They stopped to buy beer in Kanab, and 
Mrs. Sandoval drove from that location. (R. 201). 
The highway at the point of the accident consists 
of two 12-foot traffic lanes with a dividing line down the 
center. A six-foot wide parking lane borders the right of 
each traffic lane with an approximate six-foot gravel 
shoulder. (R. 91, 92). The road is straight and 
relatively flat for a substantial distance in both 
directions from the point of the accident. 
The Sandovals were traveling in a four-wheel 
drive Blazer headed for Page, Arizona. The driver was 
Virginia Sandoval. Mrs. Sandoval pulled her vehicle out of 
the travel lane and stopped in the emergency lane. When 
her husband, Wayne Sandoval, was asked whether the car was 
parked on the hard surface part of the roadway or upon the 
graveled shoulder, Mr. Sandoval responded, "It was about 
half and half, the shoulder and the gravel or dirt." 
(R. 28-29) . 
There was very little traffic on the roadway. 
Wayne Sandoval testified that he was at the accident 
scene for at least an hour, during which time only three or 
four vehicles passed the accident scene. (R. 64-65). 
Mr. Sandoval characterized the scene of the accident as 
being "out in the middle of nowhere." (R. 65). 
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Wayne Sandoval testified that the last time he 
saw his wifef Virginia Sandoval, prior to seeing her laying 
in the roadway after having been struck by the Smith auto-
mobile , she was in a safe position on the north side of the 
highway. At the same time he also noticed the lights 
of the Smith vehicle approaching from the west towards the 
spot where Virginia Sandoval was eventually struck. Wayne 
Sandoval estimated that the Smith vehicle was approximately 
600 feet away. (R. 62). 
Mrs. Sandoval was wearing a brown vest, a darkish 
beige blouse, and blue jeans at the time of the accident. 
(R. 290). 
Leo Blatter, a passenger in the Sandoval vehicle 
told the investigating officers that Wayne and his wife, 
Virginia, had been drinking quite a bit, and from what he 
observed, it looked like Virginia walked out in front of 
the Smith vehicle. (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 31, introduced 
and accepted by stipulation of counsel.) 
Mr. Phil Ellsworth, an eye witness to the 
incident, gave the following statement which was read into 
the record. (R. 81). 
MR. ELLIS: Now, as you approached, can 
you tell us what you recall seeing. 
MR. ELLSWORTH: Yes. I was heading 
down the highway and I noticed a vehicle with its 
light flashing on the side of the road and then I 
noticed the headlights of the other vehicle 
coming towards me and then, like I said, when I 
was between 200-300 yards away approximately 
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from the vehicle with the flashing lights, the 
car that was coming towards me moved out toward 
the middle of the highway to go around itf you 
know, giving it some clearance. And I was 
still a considerable distance away, and then it 
drove • . . 
MR. IVIE: You mean it moved . . . 
MR. ELLSWORTH: It moved towards the 
center line. 
MR. IVIE: Away from the side of the 
road. 
MR. ELLSWORTH: Correct, away from the 
side of the road where the vehicle had its lights 
flashing to give it some clearancef then, all of 
a sudden, just before the impact occurred, I saw 
a person standing in the, what looked like right 
in the middle of the road. And then quickly the 
vehicle that was coming towards me swerved back 
towards the right, towards the side of the road 
where the car was parked, because the person was 
standing right in the middle of the road and the 
car coming towards me wasn't centered on the 
highway, but it was giving it some berth. 
MR. ELLIS: So the driver of the car 
appeared to you to have seen the pedestrian? 
MR. ELLSWORTH: At the last second 
before impact . . . 
MR. IVIE: And turned to the right. 
MR. ELLSWORTH: And turned to the right, 
correct. 
(R. 81 - Transcript of Recorded Statement of Phil Ellsworth, 
p. 3). 
Mrs. Smith testified that she was driving east on 
U.S. 89, when some distance away, maybe a block or a block 
and a half, she saw a vehicle on her right when her head-
lights hit the reflection of the tail lights. (R. 97). 
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Mrs. Smith's travel speed was approximately 45 
miles per hour prior to seeing the stopped vehicle on the 
side of the road. After seeing the parked vehicle, she 
slowed her car from 45 to 40 miles per hour. (R. 101). 
As Mrs. Smith proceeded to pass the parked 
vehiclef all of a sudden there was someone in front of her 
car. At the same instant, another car was approaching from 
the opposite direction with its1 high beam headlights on 
which blinded Mrs. Smith. Upon seeing someone standing in 
the middle of the roadf she immediately swerved her car 
to the right of avoid hitting the person in the road. 
(R. 97-98). 
Mrs. Smithfs car struck Mrs. Sandoval between the 
corner of the driver's side headlight and the side mirror. 
(R. 101). Mrs. Sandoval subsequently died as a result of her 
injuries. 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
1. The evidence presented at trial, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, 
could not support a reasonable inference that 
defendant breached a duty of due care. 
2. Defendant did not violate a statutory duty of 
care, and her conduct as supported by 
undisputed evidence was in conformance with 
the statutory standards of conduct. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE RULED CORRECTLY IN DETER-
MINING THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT, 
THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER ON 
THE ISSUE, AND THEREFORE A DIRECTED VERDICT 
FOR THE DEFENDANT WAS PROPER. 
In order for a plaintiff to have a negligence 
action submitted for consideration by the jury, a plaintiff 
must present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie 
case against the defendant. If the plaintiff fails to do 
so, the defendant is entitled to have the verdict directed 
in his favor. Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed. 497 P.2d 28 
(Utah 1972). 
The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was 
specifically grounded upon the plaintiffs1 failure to 
establish a prima facie case of negligence as against the 
respondent. (R. 146) . The standard governing a trial 
court's granting of a directed verdict is that "as a matter 
of law, reasonable minds would not differ on the fact to be 
determined from the evidence presented." Management 
Committee of Graystone ?ine goroeowner? on behalf of Owners 
of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines. Inc. 652 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1982). 
It is respectfully submitted that from the record 
on appeal, as well as from the evidence presented at trial, 
that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of 
the defendant's negligence. 
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Initially, it is important to make an observation 
concerning comparative negligence in the present case. It 
is respondent's contention, and apparently the position of 
the trial court, that the directed verdict was mandated by 
the failure to prove a breach of any duty by the defendant 
towards the plaintiffs. Quite simply, the evidence when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs fails 
to demonstrate that the defendant could have avoided this 
accident through the exercise of due care. 
However, in addition to examining the evidence 
concerning defendant's conduct, it is also important to 
examine the conduct of plaintiffs' decedent, Respondent 
would contend that the trial court would have been 
justified in directing a verdict on the basis that 
reasonable minds could not differ that the negligence of 
plaintiffs' decedent was the primary if not the sole 
proximate cause of this collision. However, the trial 
court did not find it necessary to compare fault in the 
present case. Rather, the trial court clearly found that 
regardless of Mrs. Sandoval's acts in contributing to her 
own death, the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate 
negligence on behalf of the defendant which may have in 
any way contributed to the accident. 
However, it is important to note that the conduct 
of Virginia Sandoval is still critical in reviewing the 
trial court's decision concerning the conduct of defendant 
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Smith. Quite simply, if any negligence is to be attributed 
to the defendant, it must arise out of defendant's 
perception of and reaction to the danger created when 
Mrs, Sandoval walked in front of the defendant's oncoming 
vehicle. 
The evidence in this regard is uncontroverted. 
In this respect, it should be noted that only one eye 
witness observed Virginia Sandoval from the time she was in 
her position of safety on the side of the roadway until the 
point of impact near the center of the road. Plaintiffs' 
counsel introduced the statement of Leo Blatter, a 
hitchhiker who was traveling with the Sandoval family. His 
statement observed that the decedent had been drinking 
quite a bit prior to the accident, and simply walked in 
front of Mrs. Smith's oncoming car. 
The other witnesses at the scene, while not 
observing the decedent's progress from the side of the road 
to the point of impact, corroborated the statement of 
witness Blatter. The decedent's husband testified that he 
did not see the collision near the center of the highway, 
but saw the decedent seconds before standing in a safe 
position on the far shoulder of the road. Mr. Phil 
Ellsworth, the driver of a vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction as defendant, did not see the decedent 
by the side of the roadf but first saw her as her 
silhouette crossed in front of the headlights on the Smith 
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vehicle. Mrs. Smith, the defendantf testified that the 
decedent suddenly appeared in front of her vehiclef that 
she immediately swerved her car to the right to avoid the 
person in the road, but was unable at that time to 
successfully complete the evasive maneuver,, 
The evidence is therefore uncontroverted that 
Virginia Sandoval was at first in a position of safety off 
the side of the roadway as indicated by her husband and the 
hitchhiker, Leo Blatter. As Mr. Blatter further observed, 
she left that place of safety and walked in front of the 
defendant's vehicle where she was then observed an instant 
before impact by Mr. Ellsworth and Mrs. Smith. 
Beyond the implications of comparative 
negligence, these facts demonstrate the emergency which 
confronted defendant. In this regard, the record is 
void of any evidence indicating that Mrs. Smith could 
have avoided the emergency through the exercise of due 
care. 
In Point II below, the respondent answers 
appellants' contentions that the defendant had violated 
statutory duties of due care. It appears clear that 
Mrs. Smith at all times conducted herself in conformance 
with the statutory mandates. However, respondent goes 
further in this point, and contends that even in the 
absence of statutory violations the record demonstrates 
that plaintiffs failed to show a violation of any duty, 
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whether founded on statute or the traditional concept of 
reasonableness. 
The uncontroverted evidence presented at trial 
clearly showed that Mrs, Sandoval did not enter the zone of 
danger until just before the collision occurred. The 
defendant testified that the moment she saw Mrs. Sandoval 
at her position directly in front of the defendants 
oncoming vehicle, she initiated her evasive maneuver. 
Plaintiffs produced no evidence upon which a jury could 
speculate that Mrs. Smith could have observed the decedent 
in time for an evasive action to be successful. 
Finally, the fact having been established that 
the decedent walked from her position of safety to in front 
of the defendant's vehicle, raises one further question. 
Should the defendant be charged with the duty of 
anticipating such conduct by others. It must first of all 
be reiterated that there is no evidence which would 
indicate the defendant could have observed the decedent 
prior to the time when she in fact did. The uncontroverted 
facts are that the decedent was wearing dark clothing on a 
dark night, that she had dark hair and skin, and that the 
defendant's ability to perceive was somewhat impaired by 
the lights of the oncoming vehicle driven by witness 
Ellsworth. 
However, even assuming that the decedent could 
have been observed earlier, more must be shown to establish 
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negligence on behalf of the defendant. Surelyf the law 
does not impose a duty upon motorists to reduce their speed 
to one or two miles per hour whenever a pedestrian is or 
may be in the area. The law of Utah assumes, as does the 
reasonable driver, that pedestrians and other individuals 
on or near our highways will conduct themselves in due 
regard for their own safety. (As respondent indicates in 
Point II of this brief, Utah law has long recognized such a 
presumption. £ae. Bryant v. Bingham Stage Liner 208 P. 541 
(Utah 1922); Mackey v. Harvey. 572 P.2d 382 (Utah 1977).) 
Rather, any duty imposed upon Mrs. Smith arises when it 
becomes clear that a party is acting without regard to 
personal safety, and appears to be placing themselves in a 
position of danger. Until such time, the reasonable person 
assumes, and the law recognizes, that individuals will act 
to prevent danger to themselves or others. 
In the present case, the only evidence presented 
on this question is the statement of the hitchhiker who 
observed the decedent walk out in front of the defendant's 
vehicle. The record is void of any evidence which would 
support an inference that the defendant had time to avoid 
the accident once it could be observed that the decedent 
was no.t only walking upon the roadway, but crossing 
directly in front of an oncoming vehicle. The trial court 
has a duty "to be guided by credible, uncontradicted 
evidence when all reasonable minds would accept it." DeVas 
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v. Noble. 369 P.2d 290 at 293 (Utah 1962). The trial 
court's granting of a directed verdict pursuant to the 
evidence therefore appears proper. 
This Court has previously stated that they will 
sustain the granting of a motion for a directed verdict 
only if the evidence is such that reasonable men cannot 
arrive at a different conclusion. Anderson v. Gribble. 
513 P.2d 432 (Utah 1973). In the case at bar, the trial 
judge examined the evidence presented by the plaintiff and 
ruled that as a matter of law that the defendant was not 
negligent. The judge summarized his findings of fact and 
law as follows: 
Based upon the eye witness accounts 
of the accident which resulted in the death 
of the plaintifffs wife and the mother of 
the three children of the plaintiff which 
accounts are related by the defendant Mr. 
Phil Ellsworth driver of the oncoming 
vehicle and Mr. Leo Blatter, the 
hitch-hiker, the court finds that reasonable 
minds cannot differ on the issue of whether 
the defendant was negligent. The facts are 
that defendant was traveling about 45 miles 
per hour, had decelerated to 40 miles per 
hour, had taken precautions to clear the 
plaintiff's vehicle which was parked on the 
right shoulder of the road, that it was dark 
and that there was a vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction when the 
decedent was struck near the center of the 
road by the vehicle driven by the defendant. 
The portion of the vehicle striking the 
decedent was the left front near the 
headlight and the left mirror. At or about 
the time of impact the defendant attempted 
to swerve to the right to avoid the 
collision. Based upon the foregoing and 
considering particularly the statement of 
Mr. Blatter, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31, 
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that it looked like the decedent walked out 
in front of the defendant's car, the court 
finds that as a matter of law the defendant 
was not negligence and reasonable minds 
cannot differ on this issue. Accordingly, 
the defendant's Motion for a Directed 
Verdict is granted. 
(R. 150-151). 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FAILED TO ESTABLISH A 
BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY BY DEFENDANT. 
An action sounding in negligence is of course 
governed by the standard of reasonableness under the 
circumstances. A breach of the duty of reasonableness need 
not involve a violation of a statutory duty in order to 
impose liability upon the defendant. Defendant has 
attempted in Point I of this brief to establish that 
reasonable minds could not have differed upon reviewing the 
evidence at trial, in concluding that defendant at all 
times conducted herself reasonably. However, the thrust of 
plaintiffs' brief on appeal is that defendant violated 
various statutory duties which would permit the action to 
be submitted to the jury pursuant to a presumption. In 
Point II, defendant responds to plaintiffs' statutory 
arguments in the order presented on appeal. As is 
demonstrated below, defendant's conduct as established by 
uncontroverted evidence, either fails to fall within the 
statute cited by plaintiff, or is clearly controlled by 
statutory exceptions. However, it is defendant's position 
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that not only was she innocent of violating statutory 
duties, but at all times conducted herself in conformance 
with the more general standard of reasonableness under the 
circumstances. 
A. THE DEFENDANT'S/RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS 
FALL CLEARLY WITHIN THE EXCEPTION TO 
THE STATUTORY DUTY TO DRIVE ON THE 
RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY UNDER 
SECTION 41-6-53 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953) , AS AMENDED. 
Plaintiffs contend that the defendant violated a 
statutory duty to drive her vehicle on the right hand side 
of the roadway. It should be noted from the outset that 
competent evidence failed to establish that at any time 
defendant moved her vehicle left of center on the roadway 
where the accident occurred. Despite the presence of eye 
witnesses at the scene, the only suggestion of that 
possibility came from defendant. Her testimony indicates 
that while she moved to the left hand side of her lane to 
avoid the Sandoval vehicle parked on the side of the road, 
she could not state that at any time she crossed over the 
center of the highway. The sole basis for plaintiffs' 
contention is the defendant's admission that she may have 
possibly been as much as one single foot over the center 
line of the highway prior to making contact with the 
pedestrian decedent. The testimony of the oncoming driver 
further indicates that Mrs. Smith swerved to the right 
prior to impact. Defendant submits that the testimony 
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taken as a whole fails to provide evidence which would 
permit reasonable minds to speculate on defendant's 
possible breach of a duty of due care. However, it is also 
clear that defendant's conduct does not establish a 
violation of statute as alleged by plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs/appellants cite as a statutory duty 
Section 41-6-53, Utah Code Annotated. That statute 
provides: 
Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a 
vehicle shall be driven upon the right half 
of the roadway, except as follows: . . . 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-53 (1953), as amended. 
Plaintiffs' brief then dismisses all exceptions 
to the statute claiming that: "none of which have any 
application here." However, one of these exceptions is 
directly applicable: 
(2) When an obstruction exists making it 
necessary to drive to the left of the center 
of the roadway; provided any person so 
doing shall yield the right of way to all 
vehicles traveling in the proper direction 
upon the unobstructed portions of the 
highway within such a distance as to 
constitute an immediate hazard; 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-53 (2) (1953), as amended. 
The testimony at trial was uncontroverted 
concerning the obstruction on the side of the roadway 
caused by the Sandoval vehicle. Defendant's conduct in 
moving over within her lane, with the possibility that she 
may have crossed over into the oncoming lane by at most one 
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foot, is wholly consistent with the statutory exception 
outlined above. Surely, her actions are consistent with 
the concept of reasonableness under the circumstances. 
Where obstructions exist on the roadway, a driver is 
obviously not required by statute to proceed through the 
obstruction or not at all. Defendant conducted herself in 
accordance with the statutory mandate by avoiding the 
obstruction while avoiding danger to oncoming vehicles. 
Furthermore, the pedestrian, plaintiffs1 
decedent, does not fall within the class of individuals 
protected by this statutory mandate. The duty owed to 
plaintiff, a pedestrian wearing dark clothing, who by the 
only eye witness report walked from the side of the roadway 
directly in front of the defendant's vehicle, was to avoid 
injuring the plaintiff once the danger could be reasonably 
perceived. That duty is dealt with elsewhere in this 
brief. However, it is sufficient at this point to 
indicate that statutory duty imposed by Section 41-6-53 was 
not violated. 
B. THE DEFENDANT'S/RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS 
DID NOT VIOLATE THE STATUTORY DUTY 
ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS UNDER 
SECTION 41-6-54, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953), AS AMENDED, WHICH IMPOSES A 
DUTY UPON DRIVERS OF VEHICLES PASSING 
IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS. 
Plaintiffs also claim a violation of Section 
41-6-54. That section provides: 
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Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite 
directions shall pass each other to the 
right and upon roadways having width for 
not more than one line of traffic in each 
direction/ each driver shall give to the 
other at least one-half of the main 
traveled portion of the roadway as nearly 
as possible. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-54 (1953), as amended. 
This provision is applicable only in situations 
when drivers of passing vehicles are going in opposite 
directions. The facts of this case clearly indicate that 
this was not the situation. Ratherf the plaintiffs1 
vehicle was parked in the roadway heading the same 
direction as the defendant's vehicle in the same lane of 
traffic. The plaintiffs1 vehicle and the defendant's 
vehicle were simply not "vehicles proceeding in opposite 
directions". Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-54 (1953), as 
amended. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the 
statute relied 'upon by appellant was not intended to govern 
this particular factual setting. 
Furthermore/ it is important to note that the 
statutory section provides that the described conduct by 
drivers shall be carried out "as nearly as possible". Utah 
Code Ann. Section 41-6-54 (1953) , as amended. Once againf 
the question relates to a duty of reasonableness. Under 
the circumstances as indicated by uncontroverted evidence, 
it is obvious that defendant's actions were reasonable in 
light of the hazard created by the Sandoval vehicle. 
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Furthermore, defendant's actions in attempting to avoid the 
pedestrian once the pedestrian became observable 
appear clearly in conformance with the statutory mandate, 
as well as the more general standard of reasonableness, 
C. THE DEFENDANT'S/RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS 
WERE REASONABLY WITHIN THE EXCEPTION 
TO THE STATUTORY DUTY ALLEGED BY THE 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS UNDER SECTION 
41-6-61, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, WHICH 
IMPOSES A DUTY TO DRIVE A VEHICLE 
AS NEARLY AS PRACTICABLE WITHIN A 
SINGLE LANE. 
Plaintiffs1 claim a statutory duty based upon 
Section 41-6-61, Utah Code Annotated. This section is 
concerned with driving a vehicle on the right-hand side of 
the roadway. The defendant would like to draw the court's 
attention to the language of subsection (1) which states: 
"A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely 
within a single lane . . . (emphasis added). Utah Code 
Ann. Section 41-6-61 (1953) , as amended. The highlighted 
language clearly imposes a standard of reasonableness under 
the circumstances. 
The evidence presented at trial, even granting 
all inferences to the plaintiffs, fails to demonstrate a 
violation of this statutory duty or the general standard of 
reasonableness. Once again, the uncontroverted evidence 
concerning the position of the Sandoval vehicle would not 
permit reasonable minds to differ as to the wisdom of 
defendant's actions in moving her vehicle to the left side 
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of her lane of travel, or even moving as much as a foot 
over the center line of the highway. 
Furthermore, there is no competent evidence in 
the record which would support an inference that defendant 
failed to perceive and react to the presence of plaintiffs1 
decedent until it was possible to do so. Indeedf the 
evidence concerning Mrs. Sandoval's dark clothing, the 
headlights of the oncoming vehicle, and Mrs. Smith's 
evasive maneuver immediately prior to impact, clearly 
indicates that the defendant conducted herself in a 
vigilant manner. 
Furthermore, the uncontroverted evidence of the 
only eye witness who saw Mrs. Sandoval move from the side 
of the roadway to the eventual point of impact would 
further support the trial court's granting of a directed 
verdict in this regard. The statement of the hitchhiker 
indicated that Mrs. Sandoval walked directly in front of 
the defendant's vehicle. Because the decedent was moving 
from the side of the roadway during the moments prior to 
impact, she would not have reached her position in front of 
the defendant's vehicle until just shortly before the 
impact occurred. The uncontroverted evidence concerning 
the defendant's attempted and evasive maneuver would lead 
reasonable minds to one conclusion; that the defendant 
observed the decedent as she entered the zone of danger and 
reacted immediately to avoid the danger. Once again, there 
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are no facts in the record to establish a breach of the 
statutory duty, or the standard of reasonableness. 
D. THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT WAS DRIVING 
AT A SAFE AND APPROPRIATE SPEED UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Appellants cite Section 41-1-46, for the 
contention that the defendant was driving at an excessive 
rate of speed in light of actual or potential hazards then 
existing. The evidence in this case was uncontroverted 
that defendant was at all times operating her vehicle 
within the speed limit established for the highway. The 
evidence further established the traffic on the highway was 
sparse, but that defendant immediately decelerated upon 
observing the Sandoval vehicle. 
Once again, the evidence related in the 
hitchhiker's statement, establishing that the decedent 
walked directly in front of the defendant's vehicle is 
important. The testimony is uncontroverted that 
plaintiffs' decedent was walking from the side of the 
roadway towards the point of impact immediately prior to 
the collision, and did not enter the zone of danger 
immediately in front of the defendant's vehicle until just 
before impact occurred. Under these circumstances, there 
can be no controversy that once plaintiffs' decedent had 
created the danger, the defendant had no time reduce her 
speed so drastically that the collision could have been 
avoided. 
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It is also important to note that had defendant 
been able to observe the decedent at her point of safety on 
the side of the roadway, the reasonable and prudent driver 
would not anticipate that the pedestrian would then 
disregard her own safety and step out in front of the 
moving vehicle. This fact, while appearing quite obvious, 
has long been recognized as the law in the State of Utah. 
Sryant Y. Bingham Stage Liner 208 p. 541 (Utah 1922); 
Mackey v. Harvey/ 572 P.2d 382 (Utah 1977). 
The standard of conduct has been embodied in 
Utah's standard jury instructions as follows: 
A person who is observing due care for 
his own safety, has a right to assume 
that another is possessed of normal 
faculties of sight and hearing and that 
they will use them in exercising ordinary 
care for their own safety and the safety 
of others; and he has the right to rely on 
that assumption unless, in the exercise 
of due care, he observes or should observe 
something to warn him to the contrary. 
Jury Instruction Forms of Utah (J.I.P.U.), No. 16.10. 
Therefore, it is clear that the statutory duty 
referred to here was not applicable in light of the 
undisputed facts. Defendant operated her vehicle within 
the speed limit, reduced the speed of her vehicle as soon 
as she observed the hazard presented by the Sandoval 
vehicle, and clearly observed Mrs. Sandoval as soon as it 
was possible to perceive that Mrs. Sandoval was placing 
herself in an area of obvious danger. 
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CONCLUSION 
While respondent readily admits that a directed 
verdict in a negligence action is rare, it is equally clear 
that the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff must demonstrate some factual basis upon 
which reasonable minds could find a violation of a duty 
owed to the plaintiff. It is clear that the trial court 
here applied the appropriate standard in granting a 
directed verdict, and upon a review of the evidence it is 
respectfully submitted that the present case presents just 
such an instance when a directed verdict should properly be 
granted. Defendant would therefore request that the 
directed verdict entered by the trial court be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /fr day of 
January, 1986. ^"^J ^—\ 
L^tfAPHILLIPS IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
/ 
/ 
-23-
ADDENDUM 
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RAY HARDING IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
IN TBE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE SANDOVAL, individually : 
and as guardian ad litem for 
his minor children, LAVATO : 
SANDOVAL, SHAWNIELLE SANDOVAL ENTRY OF DIRECTED VERDICT 
and DANIELLE SANDOVAL, : NUNC PRO TUNC AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
IDA TSOSIE SMITH, : Civil No. 66,555 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly and duly 
before the Court for trial on the 1st and 2nd days of April, 
1985, the Honorable David Sam presiding. The parties were 
present and represented by counsel, Glen J. Ellis appearing on 
behalf of plaintiffs and Ray Barding Ivie appearing for 
defendant. 
Following the close of plaintiffs' case and 
plaintiffs' having rested, defendant moved the Court for a 
directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Court having considered the evidence 
presented in the light most favorable to plaintiffs in 
concluding that reasonable minds would not differ in their 
determination from the evidence presented that plaintiffs had 
failed to prove the prima facia element of negligence, the 
Court thereby ruled as a matter of law that defendant's motion 
pursuant to Rule 50(a) for a directed verdict must be granted. 
The Court having dismissed the jury prior to the formality of 
signing a verdict in favor of defendant, now hereby enters a 
verdict nunc pro tunc in favor of defendant and against 
plaintiffs, no cause for action. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /-/ day of April, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
O^u^^^ 
DAVID SAM 
District Judge 
JPPSMENT 
The Court having entered a verdict nunc pro tunc as 
above set forth now makes and enters the following judgment: 
Defendant is hereby awarded a judgment as against 
plaintiffs, no cause for action. 
DATED AND SIGNED this S~J day of April, 1985. 
BY TBE COURT: 
_. JuL^cA^^C"- ^sr^ 
DAVID SAM 
District Judge 
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(2) Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon 
a first conviction by imprisonment for a period of not less than five days 
nor more than six months or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than 
$299, or by both such fine and imprisonment. On a second or subsequent 
conviction, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 
ten days nor more than six months, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor 
more than $299 or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
"Assured clear distance ahead" or "radius 
of lights" application of doctrine to accident 
involving pedestrian crossing street or high-
way, 31 ALR 2d 1424. 
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for auto-
mobiles, 29 ALR 883. 
Homicide or assault in connection with 
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99 
ALR 756. 
Liability of one fleeing police for injury 
resulting from collision of police vehicle with 
another vehicle, person, or object, 51 ALR 3d 
1226. 
"Residence district," "business district," 
"school area," and the like, in statutes and 
ordinances regulating speed of motor vehi-
cles, 50 ALR 2d 343. 
Statute prohibiting reckless driving; defi-
niteness and certainty, 12 ALR 2d 580. 
Validity, construction, and application of 
criminal statutes specifically directed against 
racing of automobiles on public streets or 
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286. 
Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding 
running of automobile so as to inflict damage 
or injury, 47 ALR 255. 
What amounts to reckless driving, 86 ALR 
1273, 52 ALR 2d 1337. 
When automobile is under control, 28 ALR 
952. 
History: L 1941, ch. 52, §35; C. 1943, 
57-7-112; L 1978, ch. 33, § 9. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment deleted "or on a con-
viction under this section subsequent to a 
conviction under an ordinance as provided in 
section 41-6-43(b)" after "subsequent convic-
tion" near the beginning of the second sen-
tence of subsec. (2); substituted "$299" for 
"$1,000" near the end of subsec (2); deleted 
the last two sentences of subsec (2) which 
provided that second violation had to occur 
within three years of the preceding violation 
and for suspension of license by department; 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
style. 
Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving 
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for 
involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey 
(1925) 65 U 609, 239 P 25, 44 ALR 558, 
reviewed in State v. Thatcher (1945) 108 U 
63,157 P 2d 258. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <£=> 330. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §5 609-624. 
Reckless driving, 7A AmJur 2d 499 et seq., 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic §312 et 
seq. 
ARTICLE 6 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
Section 
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at intersections, crossings, and 
curves — Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power of the governor. 
41-6-47. Prima facie limit 
41-6-48. Speed Restrictions — Powers of local authorities. 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges — Prima facie evidence. 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway — Barricade or obstruction therefor. 
41-6-52. Violation - Pleading. 
41-6-52.1. Repealed. 
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at inter-
sections, crossings, and curves — Prima facie speed limits — Emer-
gency power of the governor. (1) No person shall drive a vehicle at a 
349 
41-6-46 MOTOR VEHICLES 
speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and 
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistent 
with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, 
when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, 
when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special 
hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions. 
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful 
but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that 
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) Twenty miles per hour. * 
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school 
recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or 
closing hours; provided, that local authorities may require a complete stop 
before passing a school building or grounds at any of said periods. 
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any urban district. 
(c) Fifty-five miles per hour in other locations. 
The speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as authorized 
in subsection (3) and sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48. 
(3) The governor by proclamation, in time of war or emergency, may 
change the speed on the highways of the state. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, enacted by L. 
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, 51. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1 repealed old 
section 41-6-46 (L 1941, ch. 52, § 36; C. 1943, 
57-7-113; L. 1951, ch. 72, § 1; 1957, ch. 76, § 1; 
1959, ch 66, 51; 1978, ch. 34, 51), relating to 
speed regulations, and enacted new section 
41-6-46. 
Title of Act. 
An act repealing and re-enacting section 
41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1957, 
as amended by chapter 66, Laws of Utah 
1959, as amended by chapter 34, Laws of 
Utah 1978, and section 41-2-19, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 85, 
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by chapter 
34, Laws of Utah 1978; relating to highway 
speeds and points for certain speeding 
offenses, providing for maximum speeds; pro-
viding for suspensions of licenses for certain 
offenses; providing for the assessment of 
points for certain violations and the basis for 
and effect of such points; providing for new 
licensure after suspension, and providing for 
hearings and re-examinations. — Laws 1978 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 9. 
Cross-References. 
Municipal regulations, 10-8-30. 
Reckless driving, 41-6-45. 
Construction and application. 
This section requires that driver shall not 
drive at speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent in view of existing conditions and 
hazards on highway, that his speed shall be 
controlled so as to avoid colliding with other 
vehicles entering or upon highway in lawful 
manner, and that speed shall be appropri-
ately reduced when special hazards exist 
with respect to other traffic or by reason of 
weather conditions. Horsley v. Robinson 
(1947) 112 U 227,186 P 2d 592. 
Constitutionality. 
A former speed law was held constitutional 
as against contention that it violated Const 
Art. VI, { 23. State v. Brown (1928) 75 U 37, 
282 P 785. 
Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist charged with 
speeding under this section does not bar 
subsequent prosecution for involuntary man-
slaughter. State v. Thatcher (1945) 108 U 63, 
157 P 2d 258. 
Instructions. 
In action arising out of car-pedestrian acci-
dent in California, evidence did not justify 
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instruction that defendant had duty to drive 
car in conformity with California statute 
providing that no person shall drive vehicle 
at speed greater than is reasonable and pru-
dent, where there was no evidence that 
defendant's speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour 
was excessive or unreasonable. (Deering's 
Cal. Vehicle Code § 510.) Hunter v. Michaelis 
(1948) 114 U 242,198 P 2d 245. 
Where defendant failed to see small child 
in the street until it was too late to avoid 
striking him, the trial court should have 
instructed jury that driver is charged with 
duty of seeing what he would have seen had 
he been exercising reasonable care, since evi-
dence showed motorist should have seen the 
child much sooner, instructing jury on right 
to assume others will perform their legal 
duties and on sudden or unexpected situation 
arising without fault on defendant's part was 
reversible error. Solt v. Godfrey (1971) 25 U 
2d 210, 479 P 2d 474. 
Motor carriers and buses. 
Driver of vehicle carrying passengers for 
hire owes them duty to operate vehicle 
within such rate of speed as reasonably pru-
dent person would operate under existing 
conditions, and, where road and weather con-
ditions make driving hazardous, reasonable 
prudence requires proportionate increase in 
care of driver to avoid injury to passengers. 
Horsley v. Robinson (1947) 112 U 227, 186 P 
2d 592. 
Where bus, while traveling between 20 and 
50 miles per hour under very hazardous con-
ditions on outside lane of main highway 
which was covered with ice and slush, col-
lided with automobile approaching from 
opposite direction which went out of control 
and skidded into path of bus, and distance 
between bus and automobile, when it first 
became discernible that latter was oat of 
control, was between 30 and 330 feet, evi-
dence was sufficient to sustain verdict in 
favor of injured bus passenger for hire as 
against bus company, in that jury could con-
clude therefrom that bus driver was negli-
gent in operating bus at excessive rate of 
speed under such circumstances, which was 
proximate cause of collision. Horsley v. 
Robinson (1947) 112 U 227,186 P 2d 592. 
Negligence. 
Ordinarily it is not negligence to operate a 
motor vehicle within the speed limit pre-
scribed by statute or ordinance, although a 
jury may say in some instances, dependent 
upon the particular attendant facts and cir-
cumstances, that the operation of an automo-
bile within prescribed limit is nevertheless 
negligence. Lochhead v. Jensen (1912) 42 U 
99,129 P 347. 
Violation of speed regulations may consti-
tute negligence per se. Jensen v. Utah Light 
' & Railway Co. (1913) 42 U 415,132 P 8. 
Operating a motor vehicle at less than the 
lawful maximum speed may constitute negli-
gence under given circumstances. Fowkes v. 
J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. (1915) 46 U 
502,151 P 53. * 
It has long been the rule in this state that 
it is negligence as a matter of law to drive an 
automobile upon a traveled public highway 
at such rate of speed that said automobile 
cannot be stopped within distance at which 
operator of said car is able to see objects 
upon highway in front of him. Dalley v. Mid-
western Dairy Products Co. (1932) 80 U 331, 
15 P 2d 309. 
When a driver upon a public highway with 
his light equipment cannot see more than 50 
feet ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at 
such speed as will enable him to stop within 
that distance. Hansen v. Clyde (1936) 89 U 31, 
56 P 2d 1366,104 ALR 943. 
For general discussion as to speed and civil 
liability with respect thereto, see opinions by 
Wade, Wolfe and Pratt, JJ., in Horsley v. 
Robinson (1947) 112 U 227,186 P 2d 592. 
Where fog was so great that visibility was 
limited to 20 or 25 feet and a safe speed 
. under those conditions was about five miles 
per hour, the court cannot say as a matter of 
law that the plaintiff was not negligent in 
operating his car at the rate of 25 miles per 
hour. Shields v. Ramon (1952) 122 U 474, 251 
P 2d 671. 
What is a reasonable and prudent speed 
under the conditions and having regard to 
the actual and potential hazards then exist-
ing is a matter about which there is room for 
reasonable disagreement and such being the 
case, a jury question is presented. Lodder v. 
Western Pac R. Co. (1953) 123 U 316, 259 P 
2d 589. 
Driving in excess of speed limit may con-
stitute prima facie evidence of negligence, 
but does not constitute conclusive evidence. 
Cardon v. Brenchley (1978) 575 P 2d 184. 
Pleadings and proceedings. 
If the complaint is fatally defective in its 
allegations when viewed as an attempt to 
bring defendant within the provisions of this 
section, judgment for plaintiff will be 
reversed. Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal 
Co. (1936) 90 U 578, 63 P 2d 267. 
Questions of law and fact. 
Whether the speed at which the vehicle 
was going at the time was the proximate 
cause of the accident is a question of fact. 
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Sweet v. Salt Lake City (1913) 43 U 306,134 P 
1167. 
In action arising out of intersection colli-
sion, evidence sufficiently established prima 
facie case of negligence on part of defendant 
in failing to yield right-of-way and in travel-
ing at excessive rate of speed, and contribu-
tory negligence on part of plaintiff in failing 
to keep proper lookout and in traveling at 
excessive rate of speed was for jury. Martin 
v. Sheffield (1948) 112 U 478,189 P 2d 127. 
In action against motorist for death of 
decedent, who was killed while hitching 
small tractor to rear of an automobile, it was 
a question of fact for the jury whether 
motorist was negligent in failing to reduce 
her speed below 50 miles per hour when she 
saw wrecker ahead of her on the highway. 
Taylor v. Johnson (1964) 15 U 2d 342, 393 P 
2d382. 
Collateral References, 
Automobiles €=> 331. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §§ 641-650. 
Speed, 7A AmJur 2d 394 et seq., Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 218 et seq. 
Application of "assured clear distance 
ahead'* or "radius of lights" doctrine to acci-
dent involving pedestrian crossing street or 
highway, 31 ALR 2d 1424. 
"Assured clear distance" statute or rule as 
applied at hill or curve, 133 ALR 967. 
Competency of nonexpert's testimony 
based on sound alone as to speed of motor 
vehicle involved in accident, 33 ALR 3d 1405. 
Conflict between statutes and local regula-
tions as to speed, 21 ALR 1187, 64 ALR 994, 
147 ALR 529. 
Criminal or penal responsibility of public 
officer or employee for violating speed regu-
lations, 9 ALR 367. 
Driving at illegal speed as reckless driving 
within statute making reckless driving a 
National emergency. 
"National emergency" as used in former 
provision authorizing governor to change 
speed limit by proclamation meant an 
unforeseen combination of circumstances 
calling for immediate action by national 
leaders and support from citizens for the 
safety, peace, health and general welfare of 
the nation; the 1973 Arab oil embargo was 
such an emergency and governor could 
validly reduce state-wide speed limit to 55 
criminal offense, 86 ALR 1281, 52 ALR 2d 
1337. 
Driving automobile at a speed which pre-
vents stopping within length of vision as 
negligence, 44 ALR 1403, 58 ALR 1493, 87 
ALR 900, 97 ALR 546 
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for auto-
mobiles, 29 ALR 883. 
Expert opinion evidence of speed not based 
upon view of vehicle, 156 ALR 382. 
Homicide or assault in connection with 
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99 
ALR 756. 
Indefiniteness of automobile speed regula-
tions as affecting validity, 6 ALR 3d 1326. 
Indictment or information which charges 
offense as to speed in language of statute, 115 
ALR 357. 
Liability of public authority for injury 
arising out of automobile race conducted on 
street or highway, 80 ALR 3d 1192. 
Meaning of "residence district," "business 
district," "school area," and the like, in stat-
utes and ordinances regulating speed of 
motor vehicles, 50 ALR 2d 343. 
Opinion testimony as to speed of motor 
vehicle based on skid marks and other facts, 
29 ALR 3d 248. 
Proof, by radar or other mechanical or 
electronic devices, of violation of speed regu-
lations, 47 ALR 3d 822. 
Public officers or employees as bound by 
speed regulations, 19 ALR 459, 23 ALR 418. 
Speeding prosecution based on observation 
from aircraft, 23 ALR 3d 1446. 
Validity, construction, and application of 
criminal statutes specifically directed against 
racing of automobiles on public streets or 
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286. 
Violation of speed law as affecting 
violator's right to recover for negligence, 12 
ALR 463. 
Violation of speed regulations as affecting 
rights to recover for injuries due to collision 
with streetcar, 28 ALR 228, 46 ALR 1008. 
miles per hour by proclamation. State v. 
Poukas (1977) 560 P 2d 312. 
Validly issued proclamation by governor 
setting speed limit could be terminated by 
governor's proclamation, by legislative 
action, or by judicial holding that the cir-
cumstances had so changed that the procla-
mation could no longer serve any useful pur-
pose; governor's proclamation limiting speed 
limit to 55 miles per hour had not been 
terminated as of December 2, 1976. In re 
Prisbrey (1978) 576 P 2d 1278. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
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41-6-52. Violation — Pleading, (a) In every charge of violation of any 
speed regulation in this act the complaint, also the summons or notice to 
appear, shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have 
driven, also the prima facie speed applicable within the district or at the 
location. 
(b) The provisions of this act declaring prima facie speed limitations 
shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the 
burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the proximate 
cause of an accident. 
History: 
57-7-119. 
L 1941, ch. 52, §42; C. 1943, 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles G=> 351. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles { 588. 
7A AmJur 2d 406, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 231. 
41-6-52.1. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 41-6-52.1 (L. 1957, ch. 77, § 2), relat-
ing to resume speed road signs, was repealed 
by Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 61. 
ARTICLE 7 
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE m DRIVING ON 
RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, OVERTAKING, PASSING 
AND OTH&2 RULES OF THE ROAD 
Section 
41-6-53. Duty to drive on right side of highway — Exceptions. 
41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions. 
41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direction. 
41-6-56. Passing upon right — When permissible. 
41-6-57. Limitation on passing. 
41-6-58. Limitations on driving on left side of road — Exceptions. 
41-6-59. Signs and markings on roadway — No passing zones — Exceptions. 
41-6-60. One-way traffic — Signs. 
41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes — Rules — Traffic-control devices. 
41-6-62. Following another vehicle — Proximity and distance — Caravan or motorcade 
— Exception for funeral procession. 
41-6-63. Repealed. 
41-6-63.10. Highway divided into two separate roadways by dividing section — Unlawful 
actions of drivers — Dividing section defined and described. 
41-6-64. Controlled-access highways — Driving upon and from highways. 
41-6-65. Controlled-access highways — Prohibiting use by class or kind of traffic — Traf-
fic-control devices. 
41-6-53. Duty to drive on right side of highway — Exceptions. 
(a) Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon 
the right half of the roadway, except as follows: 
(1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction under the rules governing such movement; 
(2) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left 
of the center of the roadway; provided any person so doing shall yield the 
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right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unob-
structed portions of the highway within such distance as to constitute an 
immediate hazard; 
(3) Upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under 
the rules applicable thereon; or 
(4) Upon a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
(b) Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal 
speed of traffic at the time and place under the conditions then existing 
shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close 
as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when 
overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road 
or driveway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, 543; C. 1943, 
57-7-120; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
{14. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added subsec. (b). 
The 1975 amendment rewrote subd. (aX2) 
which read: MWhen the right half of a road-
way is closed to traffic while under construc-
tion or repair." 
Construction and application. 
Where this section refers to "half the road-
ways," the reasonable interpretation of the 
meaning of this term is that it means half of 
the roadway as it exists at the time it is 
being traveled and not half the roadway as it 
may have been laid out originally. To this 
effect see Dixon v. Alabam Freight Co. (1941) 
57 Ark 173, 112 P 2d 584, in which the Ari-
zona court construed sections similar to ours 
as quoted above. Patton v. Kirkman (1946) 
109 U 487,167 P 2d 282. 
Backing. 
Statutes requiring that vehicles keep to 
right have no application to backing. Naisbitt 
v. Eggett (1956) 5 U 2d 5, 295 P 2d 832. 
Bicycle and truck. 
Driver of autotruck who was on right side 
of street and was not on, near to, or 
approaching crossing where both vehicles 
and pedestrians might pass either or both 
ways, had right to relax his vigilance and 
was not required to do more than to main-
tain such lookout as would prevent his collid-
ing or coming in contact with anyone on his 
side of street Richards v. Palace Laundry Co. 
(1919) 55 U 409,186 P 439. 
Effect of passing from right to center. 
While in case street or highway is not used 
by others one may drive on any part thereof, 
yet, when motorist or bicyclist passes from 
right to left of center of street, he loses some 
of his rights, and may not be heard to com-
plain of conduct of those who are on proper 
side of street to same extent as though he 
also were on proper side. Richards v. Palace 
Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409,186 P 439. 
Instruction. 
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries 
sustained as result of collision with automo-
bile at intersection, instruction that motorist 
had right to presume that every other person 
would obey law by traveling on right-hand 
side of road, and that no duty rested upon 
motorist to stop or change course of automo-
bile until he had reason to believe that plain-
tiff was traveling on wrong side of street, 
was properly refused where it was disputed 
question as to whether bicyclist was on 
wrong side of roadway. Cheney v. Buck (1920) 
56 U 29,189 P 81. 
Where collision takes place upon street 
having four traffic lanes, it is proper to 
instruct as to duty of defendant to use right 
traffic lane, and as to duty of the respective 
parties to use lane 4 rather than lane 3, 
where the evidence warrants such instruc-
tion. Thomas v. Sadleir (1945) 108 U 552, 162 
P 2d 112, setting out instruction, embodying 
this section of the Motor Vehicle Law and 
the exceptions, and held to be nonprejudicial 
and not objectionable as stating the last 
clear chance doctrine. 
Negligence. 
The strongest kind of presumption of 
negligence prevails against party driving on 
wrong aide of road. Staton v. Western Maca-
roni Mfg. Co. (1918) 52 U 426,174 P 821. 
Where one who is operating his vehicle on 
right-hand side of street makes survey of 
condition of street ahead of him, and in 
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doing so he observes no one coming on his 
side of street, but sees one or more coming 
towards him on opposite side of street, he 
has right to assume that such person will 
continue onward on opposite side of street, 
and not encroach upon his side. Richards v. 
Palace Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P 
439. 
Presumption-
In action by bicyclist for injuries sustained 
in collision with autotruck when plaintiff was 
thrown in front of defendant's oncoming 
vehicle, held driver of autotruck had legal 
right to presume that plaintiff would not 
encroach upon his side of street, and to hold 
defendant liable, plaintiff was required to 
prove more than mere fact that autotruck 
could have been stopped or turned aside in 
distance of 10 or 15 feet Richards v. Palace 
Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409,186 P 439. 
Questions of law and fact. 
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries 
sustained as result of collision with automo-
bile at intersection, whether bicyclist was on 
right side of traveled road held for jury. 
Cheney v. Buck (1920) 56 U 29,189 P 81. 
In personal-injury action arising out of 
automobile-truck collision on highway, ulti-
mate question of fact as to which of two driv-
ers failed to keep his vehicle upon proper side 
of road was for jury. Moser v. Zion's Co-op. 
Mercantile Institution (1948) 114 U 58, 197 P 
2d 136. 
Violation as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence 
of negligence subject only to justification or 
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F 
Supp 254. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <£=> 153. 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles } 268. 
Portion of highway to be used; following, 
approaching, and passing other vehicles, 7A 
AmJur 2d 434 et seq., Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 260 et seq. 
Duties imposed by statute where motor 
vehicle, passing on left of other vehicle pro-
ceeding in same direction, cuts back to the 
right, 48 ALR 2d 233. 
Right or duty to turn in violation of law of 
road to avoid traveler or obstacle, 24 ALR 
1304, 63 ALR 277,113 ALR 1328. 
Validity of regulations as to part of street 
to be used by moving vehicles, 29 ALR 1348. 
41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions. Drivers 
of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the 
right and upon roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic 
in each direction, each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of 
the main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible. 
construing similar section of the statutes of 
that state. 
Collateral Reference*. 
Automobiles <S=* 170(2). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 306. 
Vehicles proceeding in opposite directions, 
7A AmJur 2d 442, Automobiles and Highway 
Traffic § 265; 7A AmJur 2d 1100 et seq., Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic § 839 et seq. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §44; C. 1943, 
57-7-121. 
Construction and application. 
Where this section refers to half the road-
way, it means half of the roadway as it exists 
at the time it is being traveled, and not half 
the roadway as it may have been laid out 
originally. Patton v. Kirkman (1946) 109 U 
487, 167 P 2d 282, following Dixon v. Alabam 
Freight Co. (1941) 57 Ariz 173, 112 P 2d 584, 
41*6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direc-
tion. The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of vehi-
cles proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations, 
exceptions, and special rules hereinafter stated: 
(a) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall 
not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the 
overtaken vehicle. 
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41-6-60. One-way traffic — Signs, (a) The department of transporta-
tion and local authorities may designate any highway, roadway, part of 
a roadway or specific lanes under their respective jurisdictions upon which 
vehicular traffic shall proceed in one direction at all or such times as shall 
be indicated by official traffic-control devices. 
(b) Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall 
be driven only in the direction indicated by official traffic-control devices. 
(c) A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be driven only 
to the right of such island. 
History: L 1941, ch. 52, § 50; C. 1943, designated and signposted for one-way traffic 
57-7-127; L 1969, ch. 109, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction 
§ 15. designated." 
Com pile r'g Notes. ^ e * ^ amendment substituted "depart-
The 1969 amendment rewrote this section m e n t o^transportation" for "state road com-
which read: "(a) The state road commission m i 9 8 1 0 n lD g u b s e c * ( a ) ' 
may designate any highway or any separate
 r . . . , » -« . , .« - -« 
roadway under its jurisdiction for one-way C o U m t c r m J «*wrenc«i. 
traffic and shall erect appropriate signs Automobiles &=> 14. 
giving notice thereof, (b) Upon a roadway 60 CJS Motor Vehicles { 16. 
41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes — Rules — Traffic-
control devices. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more 
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others 
consistent herewith shall apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a 
single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has 
first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. 
(2) Upon a roadway which is divided into three lanes and provides for 
two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center 
lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the 
same direction when such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe dis-
tance, or in preparation of making or completing a left turn or where such 
center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same 
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and such allocation is designated 
by official traffic-control devices. 
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified 
traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by 
traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the road-
way and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, $51; C. 1943, direction when such center lane is clear of 
57-7-128; L 1949, ch. 65, t1; 1975, ch. 207, traffic within a safe distance" in subd. (b) for 
i 18; 1978, ch. 33, J 14. "where the roadway is clearly visible and 
Compiler's Notes. § u c ^ c c n t e r lane is clear of traffic within a 
The 1949 amendment substituted "two or ^ d i s ^ " ^t*!**^^*?* *! 
more" for "three or more- in the preliminary designated by official traffic-control devices 
paragraph. ln subd. (b) for "is signposted to give notice 
The 1975 amendment inserted "and pro- °t »uch allocation"; rewrote subd. (c) which 
vides for two-way movement of traffic" in read: "Official signs may be erected directing 
subd. (b); substituted "traveling in the same slow-moving traffic to use s designated lane 
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or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving 
in the same direction and drivers of vehicles 
shall obey the directions of every such sign"; 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subds. 
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); and inserted "or com-
pleting" near the middle of subd. (2). 
History: L 1941, ch. 52, §52; C. 1943, 
57-7-129; L 1949, ch. 65, 51; 1975, ch. 207, 
5 19; 1978, ch. 33, § 15. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "or motor 
vehicle" after "any truck" in subsec. (b); and 
added subsec (c). 
The 1975 amendment rewrote subsec (b) 
which provided a distance requirement of 150 
feet between truck or motor vehicle except 
when passing. 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); inserted "so that an 
overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy 
such 8pace" in subsec. (2); and inserted 
"drawing another vehicle" near the end of 
subsec (2). 
41-6-63. Repealed. 
Repeal 
Section 41-6-63 (C. 1943, 57-7-129.10, 
enacted by L 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, 
8 3; 1959, ch. 67, §1), relating to distinctive 
Violation as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence 
of negligence subject only to justification or 
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F 
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009. 
Violation as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence 
of negligence subject only to justification or 
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F 
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <S=» 172(2). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles 5 326. 
7A AmJur 2d 434-442, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic 55 260-265. 
Reciprocal duties of drivers of automobiles 
or other vehicles proceeding in the same 
direction, 104 ALR 485. 
roadway markings and prohibiting driving to 
the left thereof, was repealed by Laws 1975, 
ch. 207, 561. For present provisions, see 
41-6-59. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles &=> 153. 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles 5 274. 
41-6-62. Following another vehicle — Proximity and distance — 
Caravan or motorcade — Exception for funeral procession. (1) The 
driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is 
reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles 
and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. 
(2) The driver of any truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehicle 
when traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district 
and which is following another truck or motor vehicle drawing another 
vehicle shall, whenever conditions permit, leave sufficient space so that an 
overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy such space without danger, except 
that this shall not prevent a truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehi-
cle from overtaking and passing any vehicle or combinations of vehicles. 
(3) Motor vehicles being driven upon any roadway outside of a business 
or residence district in a caravan or motorcade whether or not towing 
other vehicles shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between each 
such vehicle or combination of vehicles so as to enable any other vehicle 
to enter and occupy such space without danger. This provision shall not 
apply to funeral processions. 
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